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Abstract Kuhn argued that scientific theory choice is, in some sense, a rational
matter, but one that is not fully determined by shared objective scientific virtues like
accuracy, simplicity, and scope. Okasha imports Arrow’s impossibility theorem into
the context of theory choice to show that rather than not fully determining theory
choice, these virtues cannot determine it at all. If Okasha is right, then there is no
function (satisfying certain desirable conditions) from ‘preference’ rankings sup-
plied by scientific virtues over competing theories (or models, or hypotheses) to a
single all-things-considered ranking. This threatens the rationality of science. In this
paper we show that if Kuhn’s claims about the role that subjective elements play in
theory choice are taken seriously, then the threat dissolves.
1 Introduction
Suppose a scientist is faced with a collection of competing scientific theories,
models or hypotheses. Moreover, suppose that she cares about a number of distinct
scientific virtues—accuracy, simplicity, and scope for example. How is the scientist
to rationally choose the ‘best’ alternative, all-things-considered? One would like to
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think that, whatever the details of how the choice is made, some rational procedure
is followed to make it.
According to Kuhn (1972), scientists faced with such a choice, even if they
agreed about which theoretical virtues should guide their choice, could still
rationally disagree about which is the ‘all-things-considered’ best competing theory.
In this sense, there is no ‘unique algorithm’ that takes how well theories fare
according to the scientific virtues and delivers a ‘winner’. This is not to say that
theory choice is ‘a matter of mob psychology’ (Lakatos 1970, p.178), but rather that
the shared and objective virtues do not determine by themselves a winner, or unique
ranking of the theories.
Okasha (2011) uses the formal framework of social choice theory to argue that,
rather than there being no unique algorithm for using the objective information
supplied by the scientific virtues to rationally choose the best theory, there is no
such algorithm whatsoever: ‘Where Kuhn saw an embarrassment of riches, Arrow
tells us that there is nothing at all’ (Okasha 2011, p. 93). If theory choice were
purely an objective matter, then this would be a significant problem. But Okasha’s
approach doesn’t fully accommodate Kuhn’s claims about the subjective elements
involved in theory choice; in particular, the role scientists play in disambiguating
the scientific virtues. We demonstrate one way to do this in the framework Okasha
proposes, and show via simulation that this blunts the threat posed significantly.
We proceed as follows. In Sect. 2 we outline Okasha’s argument. Section 3
discusses subjective elements involved in the context of theory choice, i.e. the
ambiguity of scientific virtues. In Sect. 4 we argue that Okasha’s proposed way of
dealing with this in the social choice framework is unsatisfactory. In Sect. 5 we
propose an alternative treatment which we then feed into the definition of rationality
in Sect. 6. Finally, in Sect. 7 we demonstrate that with this in place, the
impossibility result can be bypassed. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the subjectivity
involved in disambiguating scientific virtues turns out to be a good thing.
2 Okasha’s Challenge
Okasha employs a simple but persuasive argumentative strategy. Let V be a finite
set of m scientific virtues, and T a finite set n of competing theories. Each scientific
virtue i 2 V provides an ordinal ranking of the elements of T, from most to least
virtuous according to i. These rankings are transitive and complete binary relations.1
When theory x is preferred to theory y by virtue i we write y i x. A theory choice
situation is a profile of rankings of theories by virtues, where a profile is an ordered
tuple h1; . . .;mi for virtues 1 through m. A theory choice function maps profiles
to an all-things-considered binary relation  defined over T. A theory x is strictly
preferred (all-things-considered) to theory y, i.e. y  x if and only if y  x and it’s
not the case that x  y.
1 In this paper we restrict our focus to strict rankings associated with scientific virtues for simplicity.
Where relevant our approach can be extended to accommodate rankings allowing for ties. This is of no
conceptual importance.
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What requirements should we impose on a rational theory choice function?
Okasha (2011, pp. 92–93) argues that the Arrovian conditions on preference
aggregation have clear analogues in the context of theory choice. Unrestricted
Domain (UD) requires that a theory choice function be applicable irrespective of
how theories are ranked by virtues. Weak Pareto (WP) requires that, for all x; y 2 T,
if x is ranked above y according to every virtue, then x should be ranked above y all-
things-considered. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) requires that the
all-things-considered relation between two theories takes into account only how
those two theories are ranked by the scientific virtues, i.e. the overall comparison
between the two be insensitive to how virtues rank them with respect to a third
theory. Non-Dictatorship (ND) demands that there is no virtue i such that for every
pair of alternatives x; y 2 T, whenever i prefers x to y, x is ranked above y all-things-
considered. Finally, Overall Rationality (OR) demands that a theory choice function
deliver a transitive, complete ranking for every element in its domain.2 With
theories replacing social alternatives, and scientific virtues replacing voters, it is
immediate to see that Arrow’s (1951) impossibility result applies. In other words,
there is no theory choice function that satisfies UD, WP, IIA, ND and OR. Okasha’s
challenge is that, assuming rational theory choice requires the existence of such a
function, rational theory choice is impossible.
If we agree that U, P, N, and I are conditions on reasonable theory choice, then
it is obvious that an Arrovian impossibility result applies. So long as there are
at least three alternative theories, there exists no theory choice rule that
satisfies all four conditions. This spells bad news for the possibility of making
rational theory choices (Okasha 2011, p. 93).3
Okasha’s argument has generated much discussion. Morreau (2014, 2015) suggest
restricting UD. Rizza (2013) and Stegenga (2015) follow up on Okasha’s (2011)
own suggestion of enriching the informational basis of scientific virtues by
providing a common cardinal scale allowing for inter-virtue comparisons (thereby
dropping IIA). Whether all scientific virtues provide such information is question-
able as discussed in Okasha’s (2015) response to Stegenga. Relatedly, Gaertner and
Wu¨thrich (2016) suggest imposing a cardinality via a scoring rule in a way that
captures the spirit of IIA in a cardinal framework. Bradley (2017) suggests that
rationality only requires ruling out certain alternatives, not a transitive and complete
ranking of theories.
In contrast to these authors, rather than attempting to reformulate the conditions,
our focus is on one of Okasha’s modelling assumptions. Once profiles of competing
theories ranked by virtues are provided, for the purposes of this paper we can grant
that Okasha’s result kicks in. What we question instead is whether or not the virtues
provide such rankings. If theory choice were perfectly objective then this would be a
2 Note that this condition is usually build into the definition of an aggregation function. In this paper we
include it as a separate condition in light of the fact that we are interested in aggregation functions that
map to intransitive/incomplete binary relations. We will use the term ‘intransitive’ to refer to the
intransitivty of the entire binary relation (), note that this is compatible with  being transitive.
3 Note that his ‘U’ is our ‘UD’; his ‘P’ our ‘WP’; his ‘N’ our ‘ND’; his ‘I’ our ‘IIA’; and where he
assumes our OR in the definition of a theory choice rule we pull it out as a further condition.
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natural assumption to make. But if Kuhn is correct, then rational theory choice
involves subjective elements as well. In particular, at least for our current purposes,
subjective elements are required to disambiguate between different ways the same
virtue would evaluate competing theories. And if virtues are ambiguous in the sense
to be outlined in Sect. 3, then particular theory choice situations do not supply a
unique profile with which to augment a theory choice function. And as we
demonstrate in Sect. 7, if enough virtues are assumed ambiguous to a certain extent,
the threat posed by Okasha’s argument dissolves.
3 Subjectivity and Ambiguity
Kuhn (1972) goes to great lengths to explain the impact of subjective as well as
objective factors in his model of theory change. According to Kuhn, the way
scientists evaluate the adequacy of scientific theories is guided by the scientific
virtues. These form a shared and, in Kuhn’s view, objective list of adequacy
conditions according to which every scientist evaluates every theory. Therefore
when confronted with a list of competing theories, scientists will produce rankings
of these theories according to the virtues taken into consideration.
Prima facie, each scientific virtue i supplies a unique preference ranking i. So
for a given theory choice situation, a scientist who starts the aggregation procedure
is faced with one and only one profile from which to generate an all-things-
considered ranking. This is a natural assumption to make in the context of orthodox
social choice theory, but it fails to capture the appropriate notion of ambiguity of
scientific virtues. Kuhn claims that:
Individually the [virtues] are imprecise: individuals may legitimately differ
about their application to concrete cases (1972, p. 357)
and relatedly:
Individuals must then still choose and be guided by the [virtues] when they
[choose]. For that purpose, however, each must first flesh [them] out...and each
will do so in a somewhat different way (1972, p. 364).
This is the sense in which subjective elements, according to Kuhn, enter into the
way scientists choose among competing theories, models or hypotheses.4 For
example, two scientists may disagree with respect to how to interpret ‘simplicity’.
Suppose the competitors are hypotheses in the form of mathematical equations,
polynomials for instance. One scientist might believe that equation x is simpler than
4 There is another natural way of thinking about the subjectivity involved in choosing between competing
scientific theories (Kuhn 1972, p. 358). When trying to arrive at an all-things-considered ranking of the
theories presented with, different scientists may assign different weights to how much the virtues ‘count’
for the final ranking. For instance, radical empiricists will most likely assign a very high importance to
accuracy to the detriment of all the other virtues, whereas others might be interested in a mix of accuracy
and simplicity. So, although the virtues form a common template according to which theories are being
evaluated, different scientists may disagree to how important some of them are. This second sense in
which subjectivity appears in the context of theory choice raises interesting problems, but we will not
address it in this paper.
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equation y if and only if x contains strictly fewer parameters than y. Another might
use the order (the largest exponent) of the equations as their guide to simplicity. A
third might use the computational labour required to generate solutions to the
equations). Alternatively, suppose the competing theories consist of qualitative
statements that consist of equal numbers of universally quantified conjuncts. One
way of comparing them with respect to accuracy would be to simply count the
number of strictly true conjuncts. Another would be to compare the absolute number
of falsifying instances (by summing the number of falsifiers across the conjunction).
These may plausibly deliver different results. Irrespective of the different reasons
for taking virtues to be ambiguous, Kuhn believes that:
The considerable effectiveness of [scientific virtues] does not...depend on their
being sufficiently articulated to dictate the choice of each individual who
subscribes to them (1972, p. 362).
Therefore, although the virtues according to which decisions are being made are
objective and shared by every member of a particular scientific community, the way
each virtue ranks theories is not a matter of fact. There are three senses in which this
could be the case, mapping to three different ways of understanding the ‘‘concrete
cases’’ Kuhn talks about. First, the same scientist is free to adopt a different
interpretation in different theory choice scenarios (i.e. where choosing among
different sets of competing theories, models, or hypotheses). Second, the same
scientist is free to adopt a different interpretation in different theory application
scenarios (i.e. where the theories in question are fixed, but applied to different target
systems). In some of these scenarios she may interpret simplicity in one way
(number of parameters say), and in another she may adopt a different interpretation
(computational labour required to make predictions say). In other words, there is no
threat of irrationality stemming from this kind of inter-context inconsistency with
respect to the interpretation of a virtue.
But more significantly from our current perspective, even in a particular theory
choice scenario, where the pertinent virtues, competitors, and application are fixed,
different scientists may legitimately disagree about how to interpret each scientific
virtue in that context. Such different interpretations can presumably lead to different
orderings of theories, and therefore different profiles with respect to which to apply
an aggregation procedure. In this sense, even in a particular theory choice context,
there is no ‘matter of fact’ with respect to how a scientific virtue orders the
competing theories. Different rankings can be equally ‘correct’, and thus a scientific
virtue can be ambiguous between them. To explain why someone ranks theories in a
particular context according to simplicity is a question for the sociologist and
psychologist, thinks Kuhn, and not for the analytical philosopher of science.
So, to sum up. In particular theory choice contexts, scientific virtues can be
ambiguous across multiple orderings of the competitors. Different sociological and
psychological facts about the scientists involved can legitimately lead them to
disambiguate a virtue in a different manner. Ambiguity thus allows for some
freedom of movement between different rankings. How much freedom of
movement differs from context to context and also depends on the subjective
reasons guiding individual scientists towards particular rankings. In this paper we
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model this space of movement and investigate the impact this extra dimension of
theory choice has on the notion of scientific rationality and ultimately on bypassing
the impossibility Okasha discusses.
4 Okasha’s Treatment
Okasha claims that ‘[d]isambiguation can always be carried out by sub-dividing an
ambiguous [virtue]’ (2011, p. 85) into non-ambiguous distinct preference rankings,
each of which are included in the profile of rankings that a theory choice function
takes as an argument. So if, for example, simplicity is ambiguous between two
distinct rankings si and si0 , then both are included in the profile.
This approach is unsatisfactory as it does not capture Kuhn’s claims about
legitimate disagreement with respect to how virtues apply to concrete cases. Rather
than modelling si and si0 as competing disambiguations of simplicity, Okasha’s
approach treats them as being compatible alternatives. So multiple scientists who
disagreed with respect to how to disambiguate simplicity in a concrete instance of
theory choice would be treated as agreeing that each disambiguation should be used
for the purpose of generating an all-things-considered ranking. Okasha’s approach
thus multiplies the objective element of theory choice—an additional virtue for each
disambiguation of a virtue—rather than recognising Kuhn’s claim that there is a
subjective element involved in turning these less than fully articulated notions into
ones that can guide choice.
We therefore believe that an alternative account of ambiguity in theory choice is
worth pursuing. We propose such an account below and argue that it formally
captures the idea that virtues are ambiguous in Kuhn’s sense, thus capturing the
subjective element involved in theory choice, and that it blunts the threat posed by
Okasha’s argument.
5 A Kuhnian Construal of Ambiguity
We have argued that on Kuhn’s construal of theory choice scientific virtues cannot
provide an objective (or in any sense ‘true’) ordering of theories. Therefore, given
their ambiguity, scientists can have some freedom of movement in between
different orderings of the same set of theories under the same virtue. How different
can two rankings be so that a scientist treats them as being different disambiguations
of the same virtue? This is sensitive to how many different ways there are to rank
the alternatives, which is sensitive to the size of the choice set under consideration.
For n alternatives, there are n! distinct (strict) rankings over them. So, with respect
to our example of choosing between T ¼ fx; y; zg, there are 6 possible rankings
over T. A virtue that specified a precise ranking would be unambiguous. A virtue
which was maximally ambiguous between all of these 6 would be uninformative.
Between these two extremes, there are multiple ways of setting a sensible threshold.
One obvious way to proceed is to define a notion of ‘closeness’ between two
rankings in terms of the number of their pairwise disagreements. Two rankings are
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‘close’, for instance, if and only if they differ on only one pair of alternatives. To
understand this notion of ‘closeness’ better assume T ¼ fx; y; z; u; vg and consider
the four rankings which are close to the ranking v i u i z i y i x (see Fig. 1).
This notion can be extended in a natural way to profiles. To illustrate this
consider the following example. Suppose a scientific community is faced with the
choice out of T ¼ fx; y; z; u; vg, by means of 3 virtues, i, j, k and that x j v j
u j z j y and y k x k v k u k z. In the set displayed in Fig. 2 all profiles are
close to the profile in which v i u i z i y i x.
There are two different ways in which the definition of ‘closeness’ can be
relaxed. Firstly, we have so far assumed two rankings are ‘close’ if they differ in at
most the ordering of a single pair of theories. This makes more sense if the set of
alternatives is small than it does for larger sets. Consequently, in general, we may
consider two rankings as being close even if they differ in the ordering of b pairs of
alternatives. In the example presented in Fig. 1 b ¼ 1, which meant that for any
given ranking there are four others which are close to it. But if b ¼ 2 then this grows
to include 9 more additional rankings. And if b ¼ 10 then this corresponds to a
trivial notion of closeness in the sense that any way of ranking the alternatives is
close to any other. In general, for a set of n alternatives, the maximum value b can
take is
nðn1Þ
2
. As before, this generalized relation of closeness can be naturally
extended to deliver a notion of closeness for profiles.
Secondly, there is no reason why closeness between profiles be judged in
reference to only one virtue. That is, for a given profile there may be profiles which
are close to it in the sense in which they differ from the original with respect to
pairwise disagreements on multiple virtues (or one which disagrees on virtue i and
another that disagrees on virtue j). We will use a to denote the number of virtues
assumed in the definition of closeness. In the example in Fig. 2, a ¼ 1, and this
delivered four profiles. If a ¼ 2 then there would be 20 additional profiles.
We can combine the two generalisations and obtain the notion of a-b-closeness.
As a and b grow the size of the set of profiles close to a particular profile grows as
well.5 This notion of closeness can help us model Kuhn’s idea of ambiguity.
If virtues really are ambiguous, as Kuhn suggests they are, then can the profiles
which majority voting6 maps to an intransitive relation be avoided by replacing
them with other profiles a-b-close to them? Such a move would be permissible
since, as per Kuhn, the ranking of competing theories based on scientific virtues is
not set in stone, and each virtue may be disambiguated in different ways, where
different disambiguations may result for reasons specific to each individual scientist.
The point then, is that although a scientist may have well justified (sociological or
5 Notice that if we increase a and b too much, i.e to a ¼ m and b ¼ nðn1Þ
2
, then this set collapses into the
Universal Domain.
6 Pairwise majority voting can be defined thus: for a set of virtues V, let Dþ ¼df fi 2 V : y i xg,
D ¼df fi 2 V : x i yg. Then: y  x if and only if jDþj jDj. For the remainder of this paper we will
focus on pairwise majority voting and assume there is an odd number of virtues. This means that the
output of the aggregation, under pairwise majority, will always be a strict ordering (if an ordering, at all).
We use pairwise majority vote for its simplicity in illustrating our argument. We do not thereby suggest
that it be the actual aggregation function used; clearly, for example, one may want to weight different
virtues differently.
Objectivity, Ambiguity, and Theory Choice 349
123
psychological) reasons to disambiguate each virtue the way that she does, she
cannot hold each disambiguation at the same time, on pain of her favoured
aggregation function mapping to an intransitive/incomplete result. But, if she cannot
hold each disambiguation at the same time, then this provides evidence that
something has ‘gone wrong’ in the way that she has disambiguated the virtues, at
least when considered together. And thus, there is nothing stopping her from
revisiting them and adopting alternative close disambiguations for (at least some) of
the virtues.
It bears noting here that we are not claiming that our notion of closeness, in terms
of pairwise disagreements with the original disambiguations, is the only (or even the
best) way of thinking about ambiguity in the formal framework under consideration.
This (similar to our choice of focusing on pairwise majority voting) is a modelling
assumption, and it would be an interesting question to consider different ways of
capturing how a scientific virtue could be ambiguous over multiple rankings.
However, it does seem plausible that if a scientist were to be forced to revisit how
she disambiguated a certain scientific virtue in a given theory choice situation, then
adopting an alternative disambiguation that radically disagreed with her original one
would be undesirable. It could even be taken as a sign that her initial attempt at
interpreting the virtue was not sufficiently well grounded. Alternatively, the
Fig. 1 An example of close rankings for b=1
Fig. 2 An example of close profiles for a=1 and b=1
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sociological or psychological reasons that led to the original disambiguation might
be seen as having an ‘anchoring’ effect. The claim is that when faced with an
intransitive/incomplete all-things-considered value, alternative disambiguations that
largely agree (in terms of pairwise disagreements) with the original disambiguations
are to be preferred.
To illustrate the potential of such an approach to bypass Arrow’s impossibility
result, consider the following case: assume three virtues are used to rank three
alternatives. It is trivial that majority voting maps some profile 3-3-close to any
Condorcet-like profile7 into a transitive ranking, since any element of the domain
under consideration is 3-3-close to any other (so think of the profile in which all
virtues agree). This is not very useful as these particular large values of a and b do
not appear plausible for such a small number of theories and virtues.
Nevertheless as the number of competing theories and virtues grow, higher
values of a and b become intuitively plausible, since for more competitors and
virtues, fixed values of a and b span proportionally less of the corresponding
universal domain. A virtue faced with a large number of theories may be such that
multiple pairwise disagreements between competing disambiguations are allowed.
And if there are a larger number of virtues we may allow for more of them to be
ambiguous.8 Notice we are not suggesting replacing the troublesome profiles (those
that instantiate a Condorcet-pattern of preferences) with simply any other profile in
the domain. We want to restrain the possible replacements as much as possible, and
we do so by only looking at profiles which are a-b-close to the troublesome ones,
for plausible values of a and b.
But what precisely are plausible values? This is a difficult question to answer in
the abstract for two reasons. First, as noted above, it does seem reasonable to
assume that the plausibility of certain values of a and b depends on the number of
alternatives (n) and virtues (m) involved in the theory choice situation. Secondly,
and more importantly, even fixing the numbers n and m, whether or not particular
values of a and b are plausible will still presumably depend on the particular field of
research in question, and the individual scientist doing the aggregation. A scientist
with deeply entrenched reasons for disambiguating in a way that led her favoured
aggregation function delivering an intransitive/incomplete value may well resist
considering alternative disambiguations which disagreed significantly with her
original disambiguation (thereby restricting the value of b). And she may well resist
the idea that she has to revisit a large number of the virtues she has been using to
guide her choice (thereby restricting the value of a). As such, a detailed discussion
of which a and b are plausible would require a detailed discussion of particular
theory choice scenarios, which we cannot do in this paper. Instead, we aim to offer a
proof of concept highlighting the viability of such an approach to the conceptu-
alisation of scientific rationality and show that it blunts the threat raised by Okasha.
In the following section we explain how a-b-closeness can lead to a weakened
7 A Condorcet profile is simply a profile that pairwise majority voting maps to an intransitive value.
8 We conjecture, that for each domain, there are minimal values of a and b such that majority voting will
succeed somewhere in each neighbourhood of profiles, and that the values of a and b are low enough to
make the rationality of theory choice nontrivial. Proving this conjecture is beyond the scope of this paper,
but is a viable avenue for future research.
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notion of rationality in the context of theory choice. And then we present some
results obtained by applying this relaxed notion of rationality to several simple
theory choice scenarios.
6 Weak Rationality
Suppose that scientific virtues, such as simplicity, accuracy, scope, etc. do deliver
complete rankings of competing theories. Then, for any scientist, a theory choice
situation can be represented by a profile collecting all the ranking of theories
according to the individual virtues. Okasha construes the rationality of theory choice
in the following way:
Rationality Theory choice is rational only if there exists a function that respects UD,
WP, ND, IIA and that takes every profile in UD to a transitive and complete all-
things-considered ordering.
If one were to accept Okasha’s principles governing theory choice discussed in
Sect. 2, then Arrow’s result indeed shows that theory choice is irrational. In other
words, there is no such function that outputs a transitive and complete all-things-
considered ordering no matter what rankings the virtues supply. Using the notion of
a-b-closeness introduced in the previous section, we aim to offer a double-tier
weakening of Rationality.
Weak Rationality Theory choice is rational only if there exists a function that
respects U, WP, ND, IIA and that for at least c profiles, takes those profiles, or
profiles a-b-close to them, into transitive and complete, all-things-considered
orderings.
Rationality and Weak Rationality differ in two respects. Firstly, whereas Rationality
stipulates that the aggregation function ought to deliver a transitive and complete
all-things-considered ranking for all profiles, Weak Rationality is concerned only
with c profiles. For simplicity, we will express c as a percentage of profiles in the
domain for which Weak Rationality holds. Secondly, Weak Rationality not only
checks the behaviour of a function applied to a profile, but also its behaviour applied
to all profiles a-b-close to it. So, in case we try to apply pairwise majority voting,
say, to a Condorcet profile, Weak Rationality will be satisfied if pairwise majority
voting can deliver, for at least one profile a-b-close to the Condorcet profile, a
transitive, all-things-considered ranking. In contrast, Condorcet profiles represent
the counterexamples to satisfying Rationality with pairwise majority voting.
The first weakening is motivated by the following idea. Arrow’s theorem tells us
that theory choice is not rational according to Rationality because for any function
there will be at least one profile that function will not map to a transitive and
complete all-things-considered ordering. But what if there really is a single such
profile for a particular function? Let f denote your favourite aggregation function.
There is a sense in which f would be less ‘rational’ (in an intuitive sense) if it
generated a transitive and complete all-things-considered ordering from only 1 out
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of 216 profiles (the space of all profiles formed out of three virtues ranking over
three theories), than it would be if it did so from 215. If a scientist used the function
in the former case she would be acting ‘irrationally.’ But she wouldn’t if she did so
in the latter. In fact, not using f in such a scenario simply because of the threat posed
by the single profile f fails to map to an ordering, would be ‘irrationally’ cautious.
Suppose a bookie offered you a choice between two bets. The first bet returns £100
with probability 1, the second £200 with probability .5 and £0 otherwise. Preferring
the first bet in this instance seems rational. However, as the probability of winning
£200 increases, the second bet becomes more appealing. There seems to be a point
at which preferring the first to the second bet becomes irrationally cautious.
Analogously, a scientist refraining from using f because of its failure in only 1 out of
216 cases appears irrationally cautious. As such, rationality can be treated as a
matter of degree.
The second weakening is inspired by Kuhn’s idea that the way in which virtues
rank theories is subjective. We understand this as saying that in case a particular
profile delivers, under an aggregation function, an intransitive (or incomplete) all-
things-considered relation, moving to an a-b-close profile is permissible. We have
discussed Kuhn’s idea of ambiguity in Sect. 3 and the meaning of a-b-closeness in
Sect. 5. The issue of what values a and b should take is still beyond the scope of this
paper, but in the next section we present a proof of the viability of this proposal for
saving the rationality of theory choice, if this is construed as Weak Rationality.
7 Ambiguity to the Rescue
To illustrate the viability of moving from Rationality to Weak Rationality, consider
a very simple theory choice scenario. Take a and b to be 1. That is, treat two profiles
as being close if they differ in how they rank only one pair of adjacent theories
according to a single virtue. Also take majority voting to be the method used to
aggregate the individual rankings supplied by the virtues into an all-things-
considered ranking. Then, for three virtues and three theories every Condorcet-like
profile is close to a profile for which majority voting succeeds in mapping to a
transitive and complete all-things-considered ranking.
What this means is that if scientists are willing to revise the way one ambiguous
virtue ranks a pair of theories then the intransitive all-thing-considered ranking can
be avoided. Given that the values of a and b are minimal and c ¼ 1 in this case, the
theory choice among 3 theories based on 3 virtues appears to be Weakly Rational.
And pairwise majority voting is the witness of this result. Table 1 documents some
more values as a function of the number of theories and virtues under consideration
(note that we have not included the, plausibly common, instance of choosing
between only two competitors. As (Okasha 2011, pp. 94–95) notes, the Arrovian
result does not hold in this case).9
9 These numbers were computed using Mathematica 10. Please contact the authors for a copy of the
notebooks used.
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The columns in Table 1 denote the number of theories which need to be ranked,
whereas the rows denote the number of virtues according to which these theories are
assessed. Every cell contains the proportion of profiles which are 1-1-close to at
least one profile that majority voting maps to a transitive ordering.
Notice that for other cases than three theories ranked according to three virtues
(so cases of more virtues or more theories) the behaviour of majority voting is not as
‘nice’. Only .88 of the profiles comprised of 3 virtues ranking 5 theories will be such
that they are at most 1-1-close to a profile that maps to a transitive all-things-
considered ranking under majority voting. Is this value of c good enough for
claiming that theory choice using 3 virtues to rank 5 theories is Weakly Rational?
This seems like a subjective decision inherent in theory choice and we do not wish
to argue either way. Instead, it is more fruitful to observe that the situation of
majority voting is improved if we relax the definition of closeness. Tables 2–5
document these improvements.
Each of Table 2–5 corresponds to a cell in Table 1 except for the top left cell. So,
Table 2 corresponds to the case of three virtues ranking four theories, Table 3 to
three virtues ranking five theories, and so on. The columns in these tables denote the
number of ambiguous virtues considered, whereas the rows denote the number of
pairwise disagreements allowed. The numbers in the cells denote the proportion of
profiles in the appropriate domain which have at least one profile a-b close to them
for which majority voting delivers a transitive all-things-considered ranking. For the
case of 1 ambiguous virtue and 1 pairwise disagreement the numbers are identical to
those in Table 1. However, as we move away from that cell, c increases and also
reaches 1 in each instance.
For a more interesting example, consider Table 3. Here we record the results for
the case in which we need to rank 5 competing theories by means of 3 scientific
virtues. Now, narrow in on the intersection between line 1 and column 2 in this
table. This cell represents the situation in which we construe two profiles as being
close if they differ in the rankings of at most 2 virtues (a ¼ 2) and on each of these
virtues the difference between the two profiles can be in the ordering of at most one
pair of adjacent theories (b ¼ 1). The value in this cell is .9385. This tells us that
only 6% of all profiles of 5 theories ranked by 3 virtues do not have a 1-2-close
profile for which majority voting delivers an overall transitive ranking. Allow two
profiles to be close even if they differ with respect to the ordering of two pairs of
adjacent theories, i.e. move a column to the right, and all profiles in the space have a
profile 2-2-close to them for which majority voting delivers an overall transitive
ranking.
In other words, assuming closeness is lax enough, all of the simple cases of
theory choice are such that all profiles (even the problematic ones) will have at least
one profile close to them that is mapped to a transitive all-things-considered ranking
under majority voting. And notice that this possibility result has been achieved
without trivialising the definition of closeness, i.e. for small values of a and b. For
instance, in the case of 4 theories and 3 virtues (Table 2) as well as in the case of 3
theories and 5 virtues (Table 4), this is the case for any value of a and b greater than
1. In the case of 5 theories and 3 virtues (Table 3), an a[ 1 and a b[ 1 are
sufficient. The case of 4 theories and 5 virtues (Table 5) is more demanding, but
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since there are also more virtues and theories, slightly higher values for a and b are
still non-trivial. Finally, even in cases in which there are still profiles which are not
close to any profiles for which pairwise majority voting delivers an overall transitive
ranking (such as Table 5, line 1), the probability of ending up with a non-transitive
profile is much lower (under any construal of closeness, i.e. any values of a and b)
than in the case in which we take virtues to be non-ambiguous.
Table 1 The percentage of
profiles of m virtues and n
theories for which pairwise
majority voting is weakly
rational for a=1 and b=1
n
3 4 5
m 3 1 .9826 .8836
5 .9907 .9375
Table 2 The percentage of
profiles of 3 virtues and 4
theories for which pairwise
majority voting is weakly
rational for a and b
a
1 2 3
b 1 .9826 1 1
2 1 1 1
3 1 1 1
Table 3 The percentage of
profiles of 3 virtues and 5
theories for which pairwise
majority voting is weakly
rational for a and b
a
1 2 3
b 1 .8836 .9385 .9539
2 .9748 1 1
3 .9972 1 1
Table 4 The percentage of
profiles of 5 virtues and 3
theories for which pairwise
majority voting is weakly
rational for a and b
a
1 2 3
b 1 .9907 1 1
2 1 1 1
3 1 1 1
Table 5 The percentage of
profiles of 5 virtues and 4
theories for which pairwise
majority voting is weakly
rational for a and b
a
1 2 3
b 1 .9375 .9831 .9935
2 .9805 .9995 1
3 .9982 1 1
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The interpretation we assign to this result is that as long as communities of
scientists include enough subjective disagreement about how to disambiguate the
shared and objective virtues, then at least some of them will be able to rationally
aggregate the competing alternatives. And theory choice ends up being rational,
albeit weakly so.
8 Conclusion
Okasha (2011) aims to prove that the situation of theory choice, if we are to
construe it in Kuhnian terms, is even worse than Kuhn anticipated. It is not the case
the objective elements of theory choice alone do not supply an unique algorithm for
arriving at an all-things-considered ranking of theories, but rather they supply no
such algorithm at all. This poses a threat to the objectivity of theory choice. In this
paper we argue that Kuhn’s ideas regarding the subjectivity of the rankings
generated by the ambiguous virtues offer a solution to Okasha’s challenge. Taking
the ambiguity of scientific virtues seriously, what Okasha shows is that across the
universal domain, regardless of the function used, it is not the case that every
disambiguation will yield a rational choice. But he doesn’t show that no
disambigutation will do this. We investigate some simple cases of theory choice
and prove that rational aggregation is possible as long as the definition of ambiguity
is sufficiently relaxed and more virtues are treated as being ambiguous. It therefore
seems that the considerable effectiveness of scientific virtues depends on them being
sufficiently unarticulated.
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